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This article considers the development 
of integration between Russia’s Kalinin-
grad region and Poland’s northeastern 
voivodeships in 1946—2016. The authors 
set out to identify the main results of Rus-
sian-Polish cross-border cooperation in the 
context of the changing historical and polit-
ical paradigms in the Baltic region. The 
authors conduct a brief historical analysis 
of this sphere of international relations. 
The genesis of integration at the regional 
level is explored by identifying the major 
areas and tools for collaboration. The au-
thors address research works of Russian 
(Soviet) and Polish researchers, intergov-
ernmental agreements, EU-Russia cross-
border cooperation programmes, expert 
interviews, and relevant analytical reports. 
Special attention is paid to programme-
based interregional and cross-border co-
operation as the most efficient form of col-
laboration for accelerating integration and 
socioeconomic development in border are-
as. Based on their evaluation of the major 
achievements, the authors conclude that 
Russian-Polish cross-border cooperation 
has been successful. Yet, there is a need for 
developing a long-term empirical model of 
Russian-Polish relations in view of the 
many-years’ collaboration between the 
Kaliningrad region and the Polish voivode-
ships. 
Key words: Russia, European Union, 
Russian-Polish relations, cross-border co-
operation, Kaliningrad region, northeastern 
voivodeships, border checkpoints 
Introduction 
The ties between the Kaliningrad 
region of the Russian Federation and 
Poland’s northwestern voivodeships have 
always depended on foreign policy fac-
tors. At first, these were Soviet-Polish 
and, later, Russian-Polish relations. An-
other important influence was the inter-
national cooperation environment and 
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the intergovernmental relations mechanisms that developed in the post-war 
world order system [35]. The Yalta-Potsdam system — which is de jure still 
in existence — is losing its relevance in the flux of global integration proces-
ses and international cooperation. This brings to the fore the regional and lo-
cal-level mechanisms of international cooperation. Considerable experience 
has accumulated in collaboration between the Kaliningrad region of Russia 
(until 1991, the RSFSR) and the northwestern voivodeships of Poland. This 
experience can be divided into two distinctive periods. The first one covers 
the years 1946—1991 when any international connections of the Kaliningrad 
region were restricted by the region’s closed status in the USSR. The second 
period covers the years 1991 onwards. During that time, the region has been 
open to external contacts. Naturally, Poland’s border voivodeships became 
its principal partners. A crucial event was Poland’s accession to the EU, 
which created new institutional and programme conditions for transboundary 
cooperation with Russia’s Kaliningrad region. Later, the programme format 
of Russian-Polish border cooperation evolved into a major tool for analysing 
and assessing the region’s relations with Poland’s northeastern voivodeships. 
 
Integration links between the Kaliningrad region of Russia  
and the northeastern voivodeships in 1946—1991 
 
The 1946—1991 period of Soviet-Polish relations has been studied in 
the context of the Kaliningrad region by a number of Russian and Polish 
scholars who try to demonstrate how the concept of interregional coopera-
tion evolved in the years of ‘Soviet-Polish friendship’ [20; 24; 32; 36]. The 
common origin of the Soviet and Polish regions, which emerged on the terri-
tory of former East Prussia after World War II, was a gift and a curse. The 
residents of the Soviet Kaliningrad region and the northeastern Polish voi-
vodeships were settling new lands in a similar cultural and historical setting. 
Most of them had to take the risk of leaving their familiar surroundings to 
look for a better life for their families. V. M. Kuzmin, in considering the So-
viet-Polish relations through the prism of collaborations between party and 
public organisations, emphasised the exceptional circumstances of the histor-
ical, economic, and political development of the USSR’s and Poland’s bor-
dering regions. ‘These regions are connected by a common motorway and 
railway network and they have common land improvement and energy sys-
tems. Whereas the newly established Kaliningrad region was settled by peo-
ple from twenty regions and three autonomous republics of the RSFSR and 
six regions of Belarus, the new Polish voivodeships were settled by people 
from across the country and repatriates from the USSR’ [7, p. 7]. 
The lowering of administrative barriers and the onset of Khruschev’s 
thaw had a positive effect on the openness of the Soviet state to external con-
tacts with socialist allies. This is corroborated by P. P. Polkh who argues that 
Russian-Polish cross-border cooperation started on June 30, 1956, when the 
USSR and the People’s Republic of Poland signed a treaty on cooperation in 
production, culture, and other areas. A special resolution of the Central 
Committee of the CPSU of August 1956 stressed the need for cooperation 
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between the Kaliningrad region and the Olsztyn voivodeship [14, p. 140]. 
The newly established Elbląg and Suwałki voivodeships joined the collabo-
ration with the Soviet region after the 1975 administrative division reform. 
As W. Modzelewski writes, the current Russian-Polish land border stretch-
ing over 209.83 km was established only in 1999. Its westernmost section 
crosses the Vistula lagoon to form a 22.21 km maritime border [38, p. 9]. 
In developing a periodisation of Soviet-Polish cross-border cooperation, 
V. M. Kuzmin explains the qualitative and quantitative increase in bilateral 
contacts between the Kaliningrad region of the RSFSR and Poland’s border 
voivodeships using data from Soviet party documents. The analysis and data 
are inconclusive: ‘In 1956, 163 Kaliningraders visited the Olsztyn voivode-
ship. In 1970, the region and the voivodeship exchanged 29 delegations and 
groups comprising 469 people on each side. In 1978—1979, the Kaliningrad 
region sent 99 delegations and groups, totalling 1,704 people, and welcomed 
94 delegations and groups, totalling 1,674 people. In 1986—1987, the voi-
vodeship and the region exchanged three thousand people comprising 500 
delegations, which was the largest number of visits over the thirty years of 
cooperation’ [7, p. 258]. 
Polish researchers from the University of Gdansk, R. Anisiewicz and 
T. Palmowski, explain such a moderate number of border crossings by the 
extreme politicisation of the existing contacts. The membership in groups 
and delegations had to be approved by the leadership of party and union or-
ganisations, which often served propagandistic goals. This idea is taken a 
step further by O. A. Shashkova who writes that propagandistic materials on 
socialism building and the communist movement of the 20th century ac-
counted for 45 % of 150 collections of documents on Russian-Polish rela-
tions, published in 1920—1990 [27, p. 66]. 
Using the data from Polish public institutions, R. Anisiewicz and 
T. Palmowski estimate the number of the crossings of the Soviet-Polish bor-
der in 1956—1989 at 233 thousand, stressing that the perestroika years 
(1988—1989) accounted for 57 % of such crossings [28, p. 17]. 
It is important to understand that the residents of the Kaliningrad region 
did not have an opportunity to cross the Soviet-Polish border freely. The re-
gion was closed and all international contacts were highly formalised. How-
ever, even the small number of contacts between Kaliningraders and the res-
idents of the border voivodeships helped to overcome the feeling of isola-
tion, facilitated cultural and trade exchange, and contributed to innovations 
in organisation and technology. The Polish historian E. Wojnowski argues 
that such contacts helped to curb xenophobia and challenged the stereotypes 
of the peoples living across the border [44, p. 56]. 
The artificial restriction of bilateral contacts was, to a great degree, the 
initiative of local authorities that were afraid of incurring Moscow’s dis-
pleasure by excessive openness and enthusiasm in forging contacts with the 
neighbours. However, there were certain achievements. These included the 
development of a four-year cooperation programme for 1987—1990, by the 
party committees of the Kaliningrad region and the Olsztyn voivodeship. 
The relevant protocol to the Declaration on Soviet-Polish cooperation in ide-
ology, science, and culture was signed on May 27, 1987 [7]. From the per-
spective of the history of international relations, that document was an im-
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portant landmark on the way to programme-based cooperation. Despite the 
problems in Russian-Polish relations and regime changes, the programme 
has been in effect for 29 years. The most recent Programme for cooperation 
between the Kaliningrad region of the Russian Federation and the Warmian-
Masurian voivodeship of the Republic of Poland was signed by the acting 
governor of the Kaliningrad region Anton Alikhanov and the Warmian-Ma-
surian voivodeship marshal Gustaw Brzezin in Kaliningrad on December 15, 
2016 [2]. 
Municipalities played an important role in the Soviet-Polish cross-border 
collaboration. In 1977, a Soviet-Polish friendship memorial created by sculp-
tor E. A. Popov was ceremonially opened in Kaliningrad to celebrate the 
long-standing cooperation and friendship between the Kaliningrad region 
and the Olsztyn and Elbląg voivodeships. This partnership dated back to 
1959 when Kaliningrad, Olsztyn, and Elbląg were declared sister cities [13]. 
Local residents and tourists visit the memorial — today, a state-protected 
cultural heritage site. There are two streets named after Olsztyn and Elbląg 
in Kaliningrad, although Olsztyn’s Kaliningrad street was renamed Dwor-
cowa (Railway Station) in the 1990s [41]. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Soviet-Polish friendship memorial in Kaliningrad [8] 
 
In general, cooperation between the Kaliningrad region and Poland’s 
border voivodeships until 1991 can be estimated as relatively productive. 
A significant limitation on the development of bilateral contacts, especially 
personal ones, was the closed status of the region. However, cooperation be-
tween cultural and educational institutions was rapidly developing at the 
time. This provided groundwork for future collaboration in a new interna-
tional environment, which emerged after the collapse of the USSR and a 
change in the geopolitical position of the Kaliningrad region. 
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The legal and institutional framework for cooperation after 1991 
 
The early 1990s were an enormous challenge to most territories of the 
former USSR. The rapture of established socioeconomic and industrial ties 
led to the loss of political reference points. The Kaliningrad region of the 
RSFSR had been a closed territory but the restrictions on mutual border 
crossings were lifted. In the first half of the 1990s, commercial contacts be-
tween Russians and Poles were rapidly developing. According to the Polish 
customs service, the number of crossings of the Russian-Polish border was 
gradually increasing from 1991 to exceed 5,000,000 instances in 1997 [28, 
p. 19]. This was a result of not only the lowering of administrative barriers 
but also the launch of infrastructure projects focusing on motorways, rail-
ways, seaport cargo handling, etc. In 1992, the Agreement between the Gov-
ernment of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of 
Poland on border checkpoints was concluded. The border could be crossed at 
the following points [4]: 
1) railway checkpoints: 
a. Mamonovo-Braniewo; 
b. Bagrationovsk-Bartoszyce; 
c. Zheleznodorozhny-Skandawa; 
2) motorway checkpoints: 
a. Mamonovo-Gronowo; 
b. Mamonovo-Grzechotki; 
c. Bagrationovsk-Bezledy; 
d. Gusev-Gołdap. 
On December 7, 2010, the Mamonovo 2-Grzechotki international check-
point was opened to accommodate the increasing number of border cross-
ings, which had caused the existing checkpoints to operate at full capacity. 
Reductions in the number of cross-border movements between the Kali-
ningrad region and Poland’s northeastern voivodeships, which took place in 
1998 and 2008, were usually associated with economic crises and plummet-
ing exchange rates [28]. 
The principles of bilateral cooperation in a new geopolitical environment 
were enshrined in the Agreement between the Government of the Russian 
Federation and the Government of the Republic of Poland on cooperation 
between the Kaliningrad region of the Russian Federation and the northeast-
ern voivodeships of the Republic of Poland, which was signed on May 22, 
1992 [19]. The agreement has been in effect for a quarter of century. It is 
remarkable that the Consulate General of the Republic of Poland functioning 
since May 7, 1992, was the first diplomatic mission to open in the Kalinin-
grad region. The first representative of Poland in Kaliningrad was Consul 
General and Minister Plenipotentiary Jerzy Bahr [26]. 
An interesting phenomenon of international relations in the 1990s was 
the missions of Russian regions abroad. Amid the post-Soviet chaos, Mos-
cow did not have time to get into the details of regional international initia-
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tives. Federal law No. 4-FZ On coordinating international and foreign eco-
nomic ties of regions of the Russian Federation was adopted only on January 4, 
1999 [22]. The Kaliningrad region had three missions abroad — in Poland, 
Lithuania, and Belarus. The most effective was the Kaliningrad Mission in 
Poland, which was established by a decree of the head of the regional admin-
istration Yu. Matochkin on September 16, 1992. The first representative of 
the region in Poland was O. Turushev. He was succeeded by Yu. Annenkov 
(1996—2004) and Yu. Rozhkov-Yuryevsky (2004—2007) [17]. 
In 1997—2000, the operations of the Kaliningrad Mission were largely 
determined by Poland’s administrative division reform, which created new 
municipalities, the country’s accession to NATO (1999), and the preparation 
for the accession to the EU (2004). A major concern was the new visa rules 
[45]. Dramatic changes took place in voivode’s offices and sejmiks. The 
administrative reform made all bilateral agreements between the Kaliningrad 
region of the Russian Federation and the Polish voivodeships legally ineffec-
tive. Thus, one of the key objectives of the Mission was to establish contacts 
with new heads of the voivodeships and to prepare new cooperation agree-
ments. The contacts with the Łódź, Lublin, Podlaskie, and Subcarpathian 
voivodeships were not enshrined in international agreements. 
In 2007, the governor of the Kaliningrad region G. Boos closed the Kali-
ningrad Missions abroad due to their ineffectiveness [11]. Today, the con-
clusion about the ineffectiveness of the regional mission in Poland seems 
ungrounded. It would also be wrong to argue that the Mission duplicated the 
functions of the Russian embassy and consulates. Naturally, a number of 
characteristics make a diplomatic institution a vehicle of national foreign 
policy interests. The primary objective of the Kaliningrad Mission in Poland 
was developing cross-border contacts with Polish regions and targeted ac-
tions aimed at resuming, creating, and maintaining commercial, economic, 
cultural, historical, scientific, and other local-level (our italics) ties. 
Alongside the opening of the Mission in Poland in 1992, a number of 
Russian-Polish advisory bodies started their operation. One of them was the 
Russian-Polish Council on Cooperation between the Kaliningrad region of 
the Russian Federation and the regions of the Republic of Poland. Its first 
meeting took place in Svetlogorsk in October 1994 and the last — sixteenth — 
one in Olsztyn on October 5, 2016 [1]. The Council comprised twelve com-
missions focusing on such issues as checkpoint operations, combating crime, 
environmental protection, joint use of the Vistula lagoon, the use EU funds, 
etc. The effectiveness of the Council was ensured by the involvement of 
high-ranking officials — the governor of the Kaliningrad region on the Rus-
sian side and, until recently, the deputy minister of foreign affairs, on the 
Polish side. 
 
Programme-based cooperation 
 
The rapid development of Russian-Polish cross-border contacts in the 
1990s laid down groundwork for programme-based cooperation. Sometimes 
this process was included in the higher-level interactions between the re-
gions of the Baltic Sea. One of the first interregional mechanisms was the 
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euroregion institution [33, p. 267]. A euroregion is a European region com-
prising border areas of two or more European states. The term dates back to 
the oldest European initiative — the Euroregion transboundary cooperation 
programme, which was launched in 1958 to bring together German and 
Dutch borderlands [42, p. 96]. Much later, in February 1998, Euroregion 
Baltic (ERB) was created. It comprised border areas of Denmark, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Sweden and the Kaliningrad region of the Russian Fede-
ration [37]. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Euroregion Baltic [3] 
 
ERB became somewhat of a hub for transboundary contacts between or-
dinary citizens, politicians, economic partners, social activists, and public 
and educational institutions. The Euroregion supervised the PHARE pro-
gramme. In 1999—2006, according to the ERB secretariat, the PHARE pro-
gramme had two major priorities — cooperation in the Baltic Sea region and 
collaboration with the Kaliningrad region of the Russian Federation. Over 
six million euro was earmarked to the applicants from ten countries who im-
plemented projects aimed to support small and medium enterprises and edu-
cational institutions, to promote youth exchange programmes, and to hold 
sporting and cultural events, conferences, and workshops [29]. 
One of the key objectives of ERB is to develop strategic initiatives 
aimed at the sustainable development of collaborating regions. Despite the 
often-voiced scepticism about the effectiveness of the euroregion institu-
tions, ERB has evolved into an important political platform for forwarding 
common interests at the levels of regional and national administrations and 
the European Union. Tangible results include the contribution of ERB to the 
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adoption of resolutions on the common problems of the Baltic region (EU 
policy on cohesion, navigation, environmental protection, and transport in-
frastructure). Another major result of political cooperation in the framework 
of ERB is the South Baltic Cross-border Cooperation Programme [29]. As 
W. Jastrzębska stresses, ‘the EU considers euroregions a form of regional 
policy and a tool to include the new member-states into the structures of 
united Europe. Euroregions are shaped by different political and economic 
interests. According to official EU documents, euroregions must serve the 
common good through consolidating efforts beyond national borders’ [31, p. 
103]. The Kaliningrad participation in the euroregion structures was met 
with both enthusiasm and scepticism. This institution was the first trans-
boundary alliance that de facto recognised the equal right of the Kaliningrad 
region to contribute to a common Baltic policy. 
The region’s accession to the euroregion structures gave confidence that 
partner regions facing similar problems would provide necessary support, 
which was very important in the period of economic instability [46]. The 
funds allocated for the ERB projects in 1998—2005 amounted to 8.9 million 
euro, which was enough to support 240 initiatives. The experience of hold-
ing international meetings and implementing joint projects was invaluable. 
Later, it helped the Kaliningrad region to adapt to the EU’s new programme 
policy towards border regions and to lay down groundwork for a long-term 
partnership. In 2017, according to the annual rotation principle, Sweden’s 
Kalmar county will assume the presidency over ERB. Partnership priorities 
will include youth cooperation, water source protection, and tourism devel-
opment [5]. However, the activities undertaken in the framework of the other 
euroregions with the Kaliningrad and Polish participation — Neman, 
Šešupe, and Łyna-Ława — were much more modest than those pursued by 
ERB. As a rule, the other regions focused on meetings between officials and 
joint socially significant projects. 
In analysing the history of programme-based cooperation between the 
EU border regions and the Kaliningrad region of the Russian Federation, it is 
important to remember that a wide spectrum of political and financial in-
struments with different goals and criteria was used in different periods. 
These instruments also differed in decision-making procedures and legal im-
plementation of decisions. 
In the 1990s, the key EU tool for supporting cross-border and interre-
gional cooperation financed from European structural funds was the 
INTERREG initiative. It was followed by INTERREG I (1990—1993), IN-
TERREG II (1994—1999), and INTERREG III (2000—2006) [39]. The Ka-
liningrad region did not share a land border with the EU before Poland’s ac-
cession. That is why the region was covered by intergovernmental pro-
grammes. This decision was based on the belief that intergovernmental co-
operation was more comprehensive than cross-border contacts and thus bet-
ter suited to meet the needs of the maritime Baltic region. This was a grand 
project. At the final INTERREG III stage, the programme’s budget was es-
timated at 4.875 billion euro [10]. 
The INTERREG programme was implemented simultaneously with 
TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States), 
which brought together the EU and 13 partners in Eastern Europe and Cen-
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tral Asia. The two programmes functioned independently but they were co-
ordinated. TACIS was initially aimed at implementing projects with regions 
of third countries, whose economies were undergoing a transition. It is im-
portant to understand that the functional part of the TACIS programme was 
developed by the European structures in 1991 in great haste. They had nei-
ther necessary information, nor cooperation experience, nor strong ties in 
newly established republics. The official stance was that the geopolitical 
changes, which were brought about by the collapse of the USSR, created a 
political, economic, and social vacuum, which had to be filled [43]. TACIS 
comprised national and multilateral programmes. One of the latter was a 
cross-border cooperation programme bringing together four states — Russia 
(including the Kaliningrad region), Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine. In 
1991—1999, over 4.226 million euro was allocated to support 3,000 pro-
jects. In 2000—2006, the programme’s budget amounted to 3.138 million 
euro. In the Russian Federation, TACIS focused on support for institutional, 
legal, and administrative reforms, for private sector and economic develop-
ment, for overcoming the transition effect, and for nuclear security. 
After the enlargement of the European Union in May 2004, the issues of Eu-
ropean transboundary cooperation were singled out to form the European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). The ENPI was a mecha-
nism for developing the EU’s external relations. Since 2006, EU regulations 
have not used the term INTERREG. However, it continued to exist unofficially 
as somewhat of a brand (INTERREG IV). A Russian exclave sandwiched be-
tween EU member states, the Kaliningrad region became part of the Lithuania-
Poland-Russia trilateral cross-border cooperation programme for 2007—2013. 
In effect, due to a delay in the signing of financial agreements, the programme 
was approved only at the end of 2008 and launched at the beginning of 2010. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. The scope of the Lithuania-Poland-Russia programme for 2007—2013 [21] 
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The programme had a solid legal framework based on Regulation (EC) 
No 1638/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October, 
2006, laying down general provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood 
and Partnership Instrument, and Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 
June 25, 2002, on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget 
of the European Communities. The programme’s preamble stressed that the 
EU was particularly interested in the Kaliningrad region surrounded by EU 
member states. Its objective was to support the development of the socioec-
onomic potential of the Kaliningrad region and the adjacent areas. The Lith-
uania-Poland-Russia CBS programme was designed to give a local and 
transboundary perspective to possible solutions and ensure a ‘leverage’ ef-
fect [18]. 
The programme’s budget totalled 146 million euro — over 124 million 
provided from the EU funds and approximately 22 million euro by the Rus-
sian Federation. Sixty projects received financing within the programme, 
including 53 regular projects selected through open competition and seven 
major strategic projects. 
The major strategic projects addressed the common problems of the 
Lithuanian, Polish, and Russian regions covered by the programme. Four 
projects focused on environmental protection, namely, improving the eco-
logical quality of the Neman River and the Baltic Sea, ensuring the sustaina-
ble development of coastal zones and improving the quality of nearshore wa-
ters of the Vistula lagoon, the Bay of Gdansk, and South-East Baltic in gen-
eral. The other three projects sought to improve the region’s accessibility. 
They boosted the development of near-border transport infrastructure and 
increased traffic safety at checkpoints on the border between the Kaliningrad 
region, Poland, and Lithuania (Kaliningrad-Mamonovo 2, Sovetsk-Panemu-
nė, and Gusev-Gołdap). The total budget of major projects amounted to 
78,418 million euro. Twelve new infrastructure objects were erected, 22 km 
of new roads, bridges, and elevated highways were built, and 64 km of water 
drain and sewage pipes were laid to meet the needs of two million people 
residing in the border areas [15, р. 149]. According to the head of the Joint 
Technical Secretariat of the programme Małgorzata Woźniak, the Lithuania-
Poland-Russia CBS programme for 2007—2013 stood out in the underlying 
political situation and created a link between the EU and Russia. The pro-
gramme not only helped to overcome barriers to the region’s sustainable de-
velopment but also contributed to mutual understanding between the EU and 
Russia [15, p. 5]. 
The conclusion of the programme was officially announced at the final 
conference of the programme and the conference dedicated to the launch of 
the Poland-Russia CBS programme for 2014—2020, which were united into 
one event held in Gdansk on December 8, 2016 [12]. 
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Fig. 4. Scope of the Poland-Russia programme for 2014—2020 [40] 
 
According to the new EU financial perspective for 2014—2020, the 
Lithuania-Poland-Russia programme for 2007—2013 is to be divided into 
two programmes — Poland-Russia 2014—2020 and Lithuania-Russia 
2014—2020 — in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Instru-
ment. It is declared that, in a long-term perspective, the successful imple-
mentation of the Poland-Russia programme for 2014—2020 will contribute 
to closer integration of the programme territory on both sides of the Russian-
Polish border. The programme includes Poland’s Pomeranian, Warmian-
Masurian, and Podlaskie voivodeships and Russia’s Kaliningrad region. Its 
budget totals 61.9 million euro — 41.3 million provided from the EU funds 
and 20.6 million by the Russian Federation. Grants will be allocated for pro-
jects aimed at promoting local culture and historical heritage, environmental 
protection, improving transport and communications infrastructure, and 
providing assistance to border management and security. The Lithuania-
Russia 2014—2020 programme was approved on December 19, 2016. Its 
budget totals 17 million euro [30]. 
 
Conclusions 
 
An analysis of bilateral ties between the Kaliningrad region and Poland’s 
northeastern voivodeships requires considering two cooperation periods — 
from 1946 to 1991 and from 1991 onwards. During the first period, coopera-
tion was restricted by objective factors, such as the closed status of the Kali-
ningrad region and the impossibility of personal cross-border contacts. After 
1991, cooperation intensified as a legal and institutional framework for Rus-
sian-Polish border cooperation emerged [36]. 
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Naturally, amid a cooling of intergovernmental ties between Russia and 
the European Union, the very fact of launching a new round of CBS pro-
grammes is a great success. As a rule, joint projects do not have a political 
dimension but they directly influence the socioeconomic development of 
border regions. Despite the positive developments, some Russian experts 
believe that there is a ‘catch’ at the very stage of application approval. 
Members of European secretariats might decline projects, which are crucial 
for the Russian side, on technicalities and lobby Polish or Lithuanian pro-
jects, which will receive additional financing from Russia. There is a need 
for an objective approach to application examination as well as for profes-
sional and experienced members of secretariats. 
The Russian and the Polish sides agree that the goals of the EU’s major 
interregional and cross-border cooperation instruments were achieved in re-
gard to the Kaliningrad region in 1991—2016. Therefore, the reasons behind 
the unilateral decision of the Polish leadership to suspend the local border 
traffic (LBT) regime from July 4, 2016, are difficult to grasp. Over the four 
years of the LBT functioning, there was not a single case of a serious breach 
of the rules. The number of mutual border crossings and bilateral trade 
reached the absolute maximum [47]. Moreover, its uniqueness and signifi-
cant contribution to the socioeconomic development of border areas made 
the Polish-Russian LBT mechanism a strong argument for expediting a visa-
free-regime with the EU [6, p. 40]. The argumentation of the Polish side 
does not seem logical and, apparently, the decision has solely political 
grounds [34]. The residents of Poland’s northeastern voivodeships and the 
Kaliningrad region are held hostage to the political situation, which has un-
dermined the development of Russian-Polish relations for many years. The 
political cycles marked by changes in Polish elites severed long-lasting eco-
nomic and business ties, had an adverse effect on bilateral trade, and under-
mined mutual trust. As early as 2012, the Polish researchers M. Chełminiak 
and W. Kotowicz wrote that the signing of the LBT agreement between the 
Kaliningrad region and Poland’s voivodeships had broken the consensus 
among Polish political parties on Russian-Polish relations. At the time, some 
members of the Law and Justice party opposed the idea of preferential local 
border traffic and spoke of a potential military threat to Poland from the Ka-
liningrad enclave [25, p. 77]. After the right conservative parties had won the 
parliamentary election in Poland in 2015, the abolition of the LBT regime 
was just a matter of time. Today, it is obvious that, despite numerous appeals 
to Warsaw from the Polish public and municipalities for resuming the LBT 
regime, the situation will remain as it is until the political course of Poland’s 
leadership changes again. The Kaliningrad region has not become a key pri-
ority for Polish diplomacy in relations with Russia. 
According to A. A. Sergunin, in 2011—2013, the Baltic Sea region 
turned from a site of bloc struggle, which it had been during the Cold War, 
into an area of active and versatile governmental and non-governmental con-
tacts, even though falling short of the cooperation ideal. Some Russian and 
international scholars called it a ‘testing site’ and a ‘laboratory for European 
integration’ to emphasise the unique and innovative nature of the modern 
Baltic region [16, p. 55]. 
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In this context, the Kaliningrad region can serve Russia’s foreign policy 
goals and become a political regulator of Russian-Polish bilateral relations. 
An important regional partner, Poland is a legitimate platform for establish-
ing transit connections between the West and the East. Other important areas 
of cooperation include bilateral trade, research, technology, culture, tourism, 
and visa regulations. Today, the Kaliningrad region is preparing for hosting 
matches of the 2018 FIFA World Cup. Although the experiment in issuing 
short-term 72-hour visas to foreign citizens and stateless persons for visiting 
the Kaliningrad region was completed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [9], 
the region’s leadership is developing new mechanisms for visa-free entry to 
the region. Draft amendments to the federal law on the special economic 
zone on the territory of the Kaliningrad region is being submitted to the 
Government of the Russian Federation. If accepted, these amendments will 
ensure a simplified issue of one-entry business, tourist, and humanitarian 
visas valid for up to thirty days with a permission to stay in the Russian Fed-
eration for up to eight days. It will be possible to obtain a visa in electronic 
format upon approval from a federal executive authority specialising in for-
eign affairs [23]. 
In view of the long-lasting practical cooperation between the Kaliningrad 
region of the Russian Federation and the Polish voivodeships, it seems nec-
essary to develop an empirical model of Russian-Polish relations for a long-
term perspective. The authors believe that such a model should focus on add-
ing weight to the ‘Kaliningrad factor’ in Moscow’s foreign policy strategy 
for Poland, turning the region into a platform for international summits and 
scientific and cultural events, opening Russian-Polish dialogue centres in 
Kaliningrad, etc. If both sides take effort, such an approach will create an 
atmosphere of international openness in the region and help to reach sus-
tainable compromises on contentious issues of bilateral relations. 
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